Beijing Punishes Europe on Trade as It Seeks EU Support Against US Pressure

China courts EU against U.S. pressure yet slaps tariffs and bans on brandy and medical gear—pushing Brussels toward tougher trade defenses.

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas (R) and China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi (L) attend a meeting as part of the 13th EU–China Strategic Dialogue, in Brussels, on July 2, 2025. François Walschaerts/AFP via Getty Images

News Analysis

China is courting the European Union while punishing it at the same time—and the contradiction is starting to bite.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrived in Brussels on July 2 to prepare a summit marking 50 years of EU–China ties. Two days later, Beijing imposed tariffs of up to 34.9 percent on European brandy. On July 6, it went further, barring most EU suppliers from bidding on large Chinese medical device contracts.

Both moves landed squarely in the middle of Yi’s charm tour of Brussels, Berlin, and Paris.

Wang Yi is asking Europe to stand with Beijing against rising U.S. pressure. Yet Beijing is squeezing the very exports Europe cares about—an approach that analysts say is driving the two sides farther apart.

They note that Europe’s security still hinges on Washington, its patience with China’s market barriers is wearing thin, and Beijing’s continued backing of Russia’s war in Ukraine makes any talk of political rapprochement ring hollow.

Beijing’s 1–2 Punch

On July 4, the Chinese Commerce Ministry slapped tariffs of up to 34.9 percent on EU-made brandy, effective the next day, citing anti-dumping violations. Two days later, on July 6, the Finance Ministry stated that EU companies that do not already manufacture in China may no longer compete for large hospital tenders; non-EU bidders must cap EU-sourced parts at 50 percent of the contract value.

The restrictions apply to Chinese medical device contracts worth more than 45 million yuan (about $6.2 million).

The order strikes at Europe’s high-end niches—from prosthetics and surgical tools to endoscopes and artificial organs—while making a single exemption for medical equipment that European companies alone can supply.

Brussels has complained for years that while about 95 percent of EU public tenders are open to foreign firms, European companies see almost no access to contracts with the Chinese regime.

On June 20, the European Commission finally pulled the trigger: Using its new International Procurement Instrument, it barred Chinese firms from bidding on EU medical device tenders worth more than 5 million euros ($5.7 million) across the bloc’s 27 members.

Medical gear and brandy are merely the latest flashpoints. Brussels is investigating Chinese bids for wind turbines, rail projects, and solar panels and has imposed provisional tariffs of up to 35.3 percent on Chinese electric vehicles, citing heavy state subsidies.

China affairs analyst Wang He told The Epoch Times that the EU’s measures followed months of investigation, dialogue, and failed negotiations. Beijing, without finding a just cause, “retaliated immediately and signaled an all-out confrontation.”

That wolf-warrior diplomacy “is a heavy blow to China–EU relations,” according to He.

“Wang Yi came to Europe trying to pull the EU closer to China and drive a wedge between the EU and the U.S.,” he said. “But when it comes to economic interests, Beijing refuses to make real concessions. China wants the EU on its side while still acting tough toward it. That’s the contradiction.”

Russia in the Room

Trust was already fraying over Ukraine.

“Enabling war in Europe while seeking closer ties with Europe is a contradiction Beijing must address,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas warned Yi during their July 2 meeting in Brussels.

Behind closed doors, Yi reportedly told Kallas that Beijing cannot afford a Russian defeat for fear the United States would then turn its full attention to China—an admission that departs from Beijing’s usual claims of neutrality.

Kallas pressed Beijing to “cease all material support” for Russia’s war machine.

Oleh Ivashchenko, head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, said in late May that he has “confirmed” intelligence that China is supplying machine tools, specialty chemicals, gunpowder, and drone electronics to at least 20 Russian arms factories.

As of early 2025, he said, 80 percent of critical electronics in Russian drones came from China, often funneled through shell companies.

The fallout has reached Chinese property.

A Russian drone strike on Ukraine’s southern port city of Odesa between July 3 and July 4 damaged China’s own consulate there; investigators found that the wreckage of the drones used in the attack contained Chinese parts.

The Limits of Beijing’s Leverage

As with the United States, China runs a lopsided trade surplus with Europe—more than $300 billion in 2024—so outright retaliation could hurt Beijing more than Brussels.

Europe’s security is backed by Washington through NATO, and its largest export customer is also the United States.

“Between Washington and Beijing, Europe will almost definitely lean toward the U.S.,” Yeh Yao-Yuan, professor of international studies at the University of St. Thomas, told The Epoch Times.

“Trust is eroding fast. Beijing’s attempt to court the EU has resulted in more friction.”

By blocking hospital tenders, Beijing also risks self-inflicted pain. High-end medical devices remain one of the few sectors in which China depends heavily on European technology, He noted.

“China risks denying its own patients world-class equipment,” he said.

The standoff is spreading. While Brussels scrutinizes Chinese turbines, rail cars, and solar modules, Beijing is threatening curbs on EU cheese and pork.

“Beijing thinks it is strong enough that others must listen,” Yeh said. “But Europe is slowly walking away.”

Frank Tian Xie, business professor at the University of South Carolina–Aiken, said he doubts that Beijing can forge an anti-U.S. bloc.

Amid global trade negotiations, Washington is preparing fresh tariffs that will hit both Chinese and European exports, Xie said. Because Beijing is also squeezing EU trade, Europe has little to gain by lining up with China.

He said that while conflicts between nations often appear to be about land or religion, their root cause is usually economic interest; for China, battles over trade ultimately rise to national security issues.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping had hoped that the 50-year China–EU anniversary would showcase a partnership distinct from Europe’s bond with Washington. Instead, diplomats now talk of “managing differences” rather than celebrating common ground.

For now, the EU is not about to break away from China, according to Yeh. Germany and France still want access to China’s vast consumer market, but higher risks are already slowing new investment. Brussels is passing a wave of “de-risking” rules, signaling that it will use trade defense tools more aggressively than ever.

Fei Zhen, Ning Haizhong, and Luo Ya contributed to this report.