Signs of Xi Jinping’s Diminished Power Continue as CCP Faces Internal Turmoil Ahead of Key Meeting

Prolonged absences, sidelining of loyalists, and public criticism of Xi point to a wider power struggle within the CCP.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping (C) is applauded as he arrives at the closing session of the National Peoples Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, on March 11, 2024. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

News Analysis

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) approaches its Fourth Plenum—a key internal meeting amongst the Party’s top leadership later in the year—Chinese leader Xi Jinping is grappling with an unprecedented power crisis, marked by unusual absences and the sidelining of his key allies, signaling a potential shift in China’s political landscape.

Reduced Entourage and Symbolic Downgrade

Xi vanished from public view for two weeks from May 21 to June 3, an unusual hiatus for the CCP leader. Prior to that, during Xi’s inspection in Henan Province from May 19 to 20, the first-ranking member of the CCP’s Politburo, Cai Qi, was absent, which was a departure from the CCP’s normal protocols.

In addition, the head of the CCP’s United Front Work Department, Li Ganjie, a regular in Xi’s entourage in the past, has not accompanied him since mid-2024, showing a downgrade in the seniority of Xi’s travel companions.

As a Xi loyalist, Li was reassigned from head of the CCP’s Organization Department in April, a powerful role overseeing high-level personnel decisions, to the less influential United Front Work Department. His replacement, Shi Taifeng, a figure with ties to former leaders Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang, suggests a dilution of Xi’s control over key Party appointments.

On May 24, the opening of the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Museum in Xi’s home province was strikingly low-key. The museum, which highlights Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun’s legacy in the Party, saw no senior CCP officials in attendance, and the CCP propaganda media’s coverage was minimal. Notably, no Xi family representatives, including Xi’s brother Xi Yuanping, were present. Such a phenomenon shows that Xi’s familial legacy has been diminished within the regime.

On March 20, during Xi’s visit to provincial government and military branches, no members of the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC) were present, which was a significant downgrade from previous arrangements.

Military Purge and Absence of Key Allies

On June 2, former CMC Vice Chairman Gen. Xu Qiliang, a Xi confidant, died suddenly at 75, with official reports citing illness.

However, Chinese citizen journalist Zhao Lanjian explained on the social media platform X that Xu’s death followed intense pressure amid military purges, with some in the CCP’s military describing his death as a result of the pressure. Xu, a key figure in Xi’s military reforms, was very close to Xi before he became the CCP leader.

Another Xi ally, current CMC Vice Chairman Gen. He Weidong, was absent from several Politburo and key military meetings, as well as Xu’s funeral on June 8. His activities were scrubbed from the CCP Defense Ministry’s website.

Gen. He Weidong, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC), attends the opening ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing on March 4, 2025. Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images

Zhao Lanjian revealed that He and CMC member Adm. Miao Hua are under the regime’s internal investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal violations.” Miao’s information has been quietly removed from the CMC’s website, suggesting that he may already have been purged from the CCP’s top military leadership.

Furthermore, since last year, several military leaders close to Miao have been arrested by the regime. However, the CCP does not officially reveal the exact reason for such purges other than generic descriptions such as “corruption.”

Both He and Miao were rapidly promoted under Xi, making their apparent sidelining a significant blow to Xi’s grip on power.

Adm. Miao Hua (C), China's director of the political affairs department of the Central Military Commission, disembarks his aircraft after arriving at Pyongyang International Airport on Oct. 14, 2019. Kim Won Jin/AFP via Getty Images

Domestic and International Dissent

On June 9, more than 500 Chinese petitioners issued an open letter to former leaders Hu Jintao and Wang Yang, accusing Xi of corruption in his home province’s judiciary. The letter criticized Xi’s “anti-corruption” and “rule of law” campaigns as a fraud, alleging a surge in wrongful convictions and violent suppression of petitioners. It called for democratic reforms and an end to vague charges like “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” marking a rare public challenge to Xi’s authority.

The CCP frequently uses the ambiguous charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” to target political dissidents and critics. The accused are usually quickly convicted in the regime’s kangaroo court without any due process.

On April 18, Singaporean think tank analyst Michael Petraeus called Xi a “mobster” in an article in Critical Spectator. The article was brought to the public’s attention since it was reposted on Facebook by Ho Ching, the wife of former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.

Ho is a member of the International Advisory Board for Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management in China, a university that has educated many top CCP officials. Ho’s repost of an article critical of Xi was highly unusual for a Singaporean political elite and for a board member of an elite Chinese university, which adds weight to the gesture.

On May 21, Chinese dissident and political commentator Cai Shenkun explained on his YouTube channel that senior figures within the CCP have reached a collective decision to force Xi to step down from the political stage, citing his sources from Beijing. He said that discontent among Party elites toward Xi has reached a breaking point, fueled by mounting international pressure, a faltering domestic economy, and Xi’s deteriorating health.

On May 19, state-run media outlets People’s Daily and Xinhua published reports of the Party’s current agenda in the “Fifteenth Five-Year Plan.” However, the content of the articles referenced key instructions from the era of former CCP leader Hu Jintao and former Premier Wen Jiabao, neglecting Xi’s slogans. Such a move by the regime’s leading propaganda mouthpiece right before the CCP’s Fourth Plenum is again unusual, signaling the former leaders’ influence in the regime and potentially their disagreements with Xi.

Many other China observers have noted that Xi’s prolonged absences, the removal of loyalists, and public criticism point to a wider power struggle within the CCP.

“There appears to be a temporary central group that has effectively sidelined Xi’s core authority,” Wu Zuolai, a U.S.-based scholar and political commentator, told The Epoch Times earlier this month.

This signals that China’s political elite may be preparing for a post-Xi era, with broad implications for the regime’s stability and international relations.

Li Yanming contributed to this report.